My TechChange Swan Song

Cross posted from the TechChange blog

This past Thursday and Friday (May 8 & 9) I participated in the ICTs and Violence Prevention workshop hosted by the World Bank’s Social Development Office.  We had an excellent collection of experts from across academia, NGOs, and government who discussed the complexities of using technology for violence prevention.  One of the key takeaways from the event was the analytic challenge of identifying where violence was likely to happen and how to encourage rapid response.

The problem of preventing violence centers of two things; predicting where violence will occur and the ability for institutions to respond.  Emmanuel Letouze, Patrick Meier and Patrick Vinck lay this problem out in their chapter on big data in the recent IPI/UDNP/USAID publication on ICTs for violence prevention.  They point out that instead of using big data to aid interventions by large institutions, that big data can be analyzed and packaged so that local actors can use it to respond immediately when they see signs of tension.  I used this model in my talk on crowdsourcing; the goal is for the big organizations to leverage their processing and analytic capacity to produce data that can be used by local actors to respond to tension and threats of violence themselves.

What made the discussion around this challenge so interesting was that the speakers and audience were able to focus not just on the technology, but also on the ways that different cultures understand information and space.  Matthew Pritchard of McGill University gave a fantastic talk about the challenges of mapping land tenure claims in Liberia, since people expressed land ownership in different ways.  He explained that GIS mapping could contain the data on how people understand their relationship to the land – maps layers could have MP3 recordings of oral history, photos of past use, and graphical demonstrations of where borders were.  Finding ways to move beyond external perceptions of local conflict drivers was one of the goals of the discussions, and integrating technology and social science more effectively is increasingly going to be a way to achieve that goal.

This event was also bittersweet for me, since it was my last time officially representing TechChange as their Director of Conflict Management and Peacebuilding.  Starting May 9, I will be joining Mobile Accord as GeoPoll’s Research Coordinator.  After over two years working with Nick Martin and the team at TechChange, I’ve decided it’s time to focus more on data and analytics in the ICT for development space.  While I’m excited for this new challenge, I’ll miss working in the loft where I’ve learned almost everything I know about ICT4D and tech for conflict management.  I wouldn’t be where I am academically or professionally without the insights and support of the colleagues and friends I’ve made at TechChange.  While I’m looking forward to joining the team at GeoPoll, I’ll always be excited to check the blog or cruise by the office to see what amazing new animation or interactive learning platform Will Chester and the TechChange team have conjured up!

Kristof’s False Comparison

My friend Emily pointed me to a post on Facebook from Nick Kristof about girls seeking education in Pakistan.  The article highlights the risks faced by girls and women seeking educational opportunities in the tribal regions; it’s well written and inspiring.  It’s good, mass consumption media about a serious problem.  But his framing comment on his Facebook feed was a bit surprising:

Kristoff

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“Africa’s Silicon Savannah”…What will Kenya get from Konza?

I was on BBC earlier today and came across this article on Konza Technology City, a tech center that will be built in Kenya outside Nairobi.  In a bit of excitement I posted a comment on Facebook that this could be a boon to investment…then I re-read the article.  I think that, indeed, it could be a good opportunity for a little Keynesian economy spurring.  The World Bank and OECD have pointed out the positive effects of robust ICT infrastructure on economic development and domestic investment outlooks.  But I’ll walk back a little bit on my Facebook post to add a few concerns that come to mind.

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Bad Economic Analysis

I can’t help myself…I saw this on Facebook and had to comment.  But instead of bombing my friend’s comment section, I decided something that was becoming a 300 word blog post should just be a proper blog post.  Read the picture below; I’ve provided commentary underneath.

Not a very good analysis of Federal debt.

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2013 Update: Kenya, TechChange and TC109

So 2013 is off to a roaring start.  I just relocated to a new place in the Petworth neighborhood in D.C. and learned that all the staff I worked with at the U.S. Institute of Peace back in the day all live within 5 blocks of me.  But the big things on the horizon are my trip to Kenya that starts in a week, and TC109: Conflict Management and Peacebuilding the course I teach with TechChange.

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Crowdsourcing 2013′s Content!

photoSo with the new year starting Tuesday, I will be continuing to blog into 2013.  The past year has mostly focused on my interest areas, political science, conflict and technology.  But I’ve also mused on things that are not my “core expertise”, such as gun control and domestic politics.  Since I’ll be finishing coursework this spring and starting my dissertation in earnest, I’ll be doing a lot of writing this year.  So dear readers I would like to know: what kind of content would you like to see in the coming year?  If you get a chance, fill out the poll and at the end of January I’ll check the tally and write to please!  Many thanks for a fun 2012 and looking forward to more writing and conversation in 2013–

–Charles

 

Facepalmz: Gun control, armed guards in schools, etc. (Part 2)

Basically I’m just going to focus on the political economy, and problems of information asymmetry and game theoretic issues with the assertion that armed guards in schools will lead to no more mass shootings.  For those who missed Wayne LaPierre’s speech, Jason Linkins at the Huffington Post provides a really good assessment of it.

With that said, who would pay for all these guards?  LaPierre seemed to intimate that it would be a public expenditure, so that makes it a political economy issue.  It also means that the payment would be made with tax dollars.  Putting aside the incongruity of LaPierre and the Republican party’s hatred of taxes with the recommendation that we spend $18 billion tax dollars on a program, how could we finance it?  A big tax on firearms sales would probably do the trick.  In fact, while financing the protection of schools it would also drive down the sales of guns, making it less expensive to secure schools.  Perfect!  Any Congressional rep who doesn’t approve can go on Piers Morgan’s show and explain why Grover Norquist’s pledge is more important to them than a tax that would prevent, according to the NRA, another mass shooting.

But this is all academic, because some basic game theory points to the fact that armed guards or more police in schools will not affect mass-shootings on average across cases.  There have been a number of articles pointing out the fact that armed guards at Columbine High School were not able to stop the event, and they hint at why but not in a formal way.  An inherent problem with the argument that armed guards will stop a shooter is that the argument hinges on perfect information.  We have perfect information after the fact, which makes it easy to say “if only there’d been an armed officer there it wouldn’t have happened.”  The problem is that we are taking our perfect knowledge of the event, and making the false assumption that the officer or guard would have had the same information.  Hence why the school resource officer was not inside Columbine High School when the shooting started.

Realistically, we have to control for two things in a tactical situation.  Something called an OODA Loop, and the problem of information asymmetry.  OODA stands for “observe, orient, decide, act” and the loop is the cyclical process of someone going through these steps repeatedly as quickly as possible.  The standard example of OODA loops is fighter pilots in a dog fight.  A fighter pilot has really good information though; they have radar, they know if the other airplane is friendly or not, and if not, they know it’s time to fight.  From there it becomes a one-on-one process of who can go through the OODA loop faster to gain a tactical advantage.  When someone cannot complete their OODA loop (too much information coming at them or confusing signals), they’re stuck and are at a tactical disadvantage.  We see this in the Columbine example; the officers were observing (O) a confusing situation and getting conflicting information, having to constantly re-orient (O) to either deal with shooters or victims, and thus had to make decisions (D) and actions (A) that prevented them from actually dealing with the shooters, who had superior firepower.  This is an external problem, since OODA loops are affected by environmental factors; if we were going to make guards in school effective there is also a decision set problem at the individual level.

Prisoner’s Dilemmas are a standard asymmetric information game.  The actors must make decisions based on a lack of information about whether to cooperate or defect.  If both cooperate all is fine; if both defect the effects on both a minimal.  If one cooperates and the other defects, the cooperator suffers greatly.  For the sake of a school guard this could mean letting a person pass (cooperate) or making the decision to draw a gun (defect).  The problem is: who is a shooter in a public place full of kids and adults?  If you pick wrong it’s at the very least a lawsuit, at the worst you fail to intervene because you ‘cooperate’ and are ‘defected’ against (e.g. shooter shoots you first), or are in the wrong place as a shooting happens.  And of course, since a shooting has a very short time span, the opportunity to make up for a wrong decision is nil.

The problem with placing a guard in this situation and assuming they would be effective is thus: they cannot complete an OODA loop because there’s too much information, and we mistakenly attribute our perfect after-the-fact knowledge to their completely (dangerously) imperfect pre-event knowledge.  Unless the school guard uses a very aggressive strategy, the likes of which would probably not fly legally, he or she would basically be useless as a preventative force on average across cases.

You’ll notice I use the term “on average across cases” a lot.  It’s an important term when talking about public policy.  Indeed, there will be shootings and violence, and the goal of public policy is not to claim to prevent all bad things from happening everywhere.  The goal is to create an environment where the likelihood of an event like a mass shooting is lowered; since there is no evidence that on average across cases, more guns, armed guards, children charging shooters etc. have any effect on the likelihood of a mass shooting I as an empiricist am left with one conclusion.  The problem is access to these types of guns themselves.

My ordered thoughts on mass shootings and gun control

So I left a note on Facebook this past weekend that got some likes and a ‘share’ even.  Being a Facebook post, it was long on emotion and a little shorter on precision, so I promised a friend a blog post that was a bit more structured with regard to gun control, mass shootings.  Here goes.

1) The problem of event likelihood versus event duration

There was a press release from the Libertarian Party on Dec. 16th that basically said we need to allow all people to arm themselves so they can defend themselves in the face of an attack.  The problem is twofold; any student of game theory knows that once an attack has started you’re already on the back foot (thus, arming yourself is unlikely to help, since you have inherently asymmetric information about when or where a mass shooting event will occur), and shortening duration is rather cold comfort for those who are killed in shorter duration attacks.  There’s also a third problem; their sample size is minuscule.  Eight attacks since 1997 is a very small number compared with the total number of attacks in the last three decades.  Let’s unpack.

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